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Access Tiers

Each manifest that grants human access uses the same three-tier permissions block. This page states what each tier can and cannot do in Google Cloud.

Security boundaries and access tiersNested boundaries: an Organization holds an OrganizationalUnit, which holds an Environment, which holds a Project. IAM policies inherit down. The Project has a default-deny firewall and a NAT gateway, and tier grants apply at the Project. An Application inside the Project has its own service account with zero permissions. Its accessControl block adds a narrow IAM binding to a database or bucket. End users can sign in through Identity-Aware Proxy at the load balancer. A table lists what the read, dev and admin tiers grant.OrganizationBroad IAM policies are set here.OrganizationalUnitPolicies inherit down.Administrators get a CODEOWNERS rule.EnvironmentPolicies inherit down.ProjectTier grants apply here: read, dev and admin.A spoke of the Core Project VPC.Applicationown service account,zero permissionsDatabase or bucketonly what is grantedDefault-deny firewall and one NAT gateway. Egress reaches the sitesthat allowedEgress lists, plus Google's services and theoperating-system update servers.End usersIdentity-AwareProxyat the load balanceraccessControl:a narrow IAM binding
Security boundaries and access tiersNested boundaries: an Organization holds an OrganizationalUnit, which holds an Environment, which holds a Project. IAM policies inherit down. The Project has a default-deny firewall and a NAT gateway, and tier grants apply at the Project. An Application inside the Project has its own service account with zero permissions. Its accessControl block adds a narrow IAM binding to a database or bucket. End users can sign in through Identity-Aware Proxy at the load balancer. A table lists what the read, dev and admin tiers grant.OrganizationBroad IAM policies are set here.OrganizationalUnitPolicies inherit down.Administrators get a CODEOWNERS rule.EnvironmentPolicies inherit down.ProjectTier grants apply here:read, dev and admin.A spoke of the Core Project VPC.Applicationown service account, zero permissionsDatabase or bucketonly what is grantedDefault-deny firewall and one NATgateway. Egress reaches the sites thatallowedEgress lists, plus Google'sservices and the operating-systemupdate servers.End usersIdentity-Aware Proxyat the load balanceraccessControl:a narrow IAM binding
What each tier grants in Google Cloud
Grantreadviewersdevcontributorsadminadministrators
Infrastructure control-plane readYesYesYes
Spanner, Cloud SQL and BigQuery control-plane readYesYesYes
Cloud Storage object read (get, list)YesYesYes
Spanner data read (select, read)YesYesYes
BigQuery data read (query)YesYesYes
Identity Platform user readYesYesYes
Cloud Storage object create (add only)NoYesYes
Logging, mesh and edge configuration readNoYesYes
Cloud Storage object overwrite and deleteNoNoYes
Spanner DML (insert, update, delete)NoNoYes
Cloud SQL connect and IAM loginNoNoYes
BigQuery load and insertNoNoYes
Identity Platform user create, update, deleteNoNoYes
Schema or DDL changes, anywhereno tier holds itNoNoNo
Secret payloads, IAM policy, impersonationno tier holds itNoNoNo
  • The tiers are cumulative: each tier has all the grants of the tier before it.
  • The control plane is read-only in all three tiers.
  • A person in more than one tier gets the widest role once.
  • Grants apply per project, not on the whole tenant folder.
  • Identity-Aware Proxy is an option for customer-facing traffic.

The tiers are cumulative. They differ on the data plane only. The control plane is read-only in all three tiers. Infrastructure comes from manifests, and a direct change in the console is drift that the engine removes on the next run.

The permission sets are the same on Infrastream Cloud and on Private Cloud. Only the organization that holds the role differs.

Names​

Manifest fieldCommon nameCustom role
permissions.administratorsadminmanaged_admin
permissions.contributorsdevmanaged_editor
permissions.viewersreadmanaged_viewer

Name OrganizationUser and OrganizationUserGroup manifests. Never write raw email addresses.

spec:
permissions:
administrators:
groups: [platform-admins]
contributors:
groups: [payments-team]
members: [alice]
viewers:
groups: [finance-readers]

What each tier grants​

Capabilityreaddevadmin
Infrastructure control-plane readYesYesYes
Spanner, Cloud SQL and BigQuery control-plane readYesYesYes
Cloud Storage object read (get, list)YesYesYes
Spanner data read (select, read)YesYesYes
BigQuery data read (query)YesYesYes
Identity Platform user readYesYesYes
Cloud Storage object create (add only)NoYesYes
Logging, mesh and edge configuration readNoYesYes
Cloud Storage object overwrite and deleteNoNoYes
Spanner DML (insert, update, delete)NoNoYes
Cloud SQL connect and IAM loginNoNoYes
BigQuery load and insertNoNoYes
Identity Platform user create, update, deleteNoNoYes
Schema or DDL changes, anywhereNoNoNo
Secret payloads, IAM policy, impersonationNoNoNo
  • dev writes only add objects. In Cloud Storage, storage.objects.create without storage.objects.delete is append-only. Spanner and BigQuery have no equivalent. A database write there is full create, update and delete. So dev gets no database write.
  • admin controls contents, not structure. An admin can write every row and object. An admin cannot alter a table, drop a database or change a bucket policy, because manifests declare those.
  • read sees application data, never credentials. A reader can read a Spanner row or a Cloud Storage object. A reader never reaches a secret payload, a Kubernetes Secret, a KMS key, an identity-provider client secret, a VM serial port or a service-account key. Bulk-extraction APIs are admin-only: Cloud SQL backup export, the BigQuery Storage Read API, and Spanner partitionQuery and partitionRead.

What no tier can do​

No tier has these permissions. Admin does not have them either.

WithheldWhat it would expose
secretmanager.versions.accessSecret payloads
container.secrets.*Kubernetes Secrets through GKE RBAC
container.pods.execA command in a pod, which runs as the service account of the workload
firebaseauth.configs.getHashConfigPassword-hash parameters
firebaseauth.configs.getSecretOAuth client secrets of upstream identity providers
iam.serviceAccountKeys.create and .getLong-lived service-account credentials
cloudkms.cryptoKeyVersions.useToDecryptAnything wrapped with a tenant CMEK
cloudsql.sslCerts.createA client certificate, which is a database credential
compute.instances.getSerialPortOutputVM startup secrets

Every *.setIamPolicy and every form of service-account impersonation are also withheld. Because of this, no tier can promote itself to the next tier.

Control-plane changes are also withheld, because they would be drift:

  • compute.*, run.* and container.* create, update and delete
  • Spanner updateDdl and drop
  • BigQuery table and dataset changes
  • cloudsql.instances.update and .delete
  • storage.buckets.update
  • logging.sinks.*
  • serviceusage.services.enable
  • orgpolicy.*
  • resourcemanager.projects.delete, .update and .move

Two of these protect the audit trail. storage.buckets.update would let an admin turn off the object versions that make admin deletes recoverable. logging.sinks.* and logging.logs.delete would let a tier that writes data destroy the log of that write.

How grants resolve​

  • The highest tier wins. If a principal appears in more than one tier, it gets the role of the widest tier once.
  • Grants are per project. A binding applies at the project, not on the tenant folder. The folder carries only roles/resourcemanager.folderViewer, which lets people navigate the hierarchy.
  • A tier with no role grants nothing. If you set no role for a tier, the platform skips those principals. They do not fall back to a wider tier.

Outside the tiers​

The tiers cover Google Cloud IAM. Two systems decide access by their own rules:

  • Kubernetes RBAC. Dev and admin hold container.clusters.connect. It opens a session with the API server of the cluster. RBAC bindings decide what that session can do, and this model does not control them. No tier holds container.secrets.* or container.pods.exec on the Google Cloud side.
  • PostgreSQL roles. The Cloud SQL connect permission of admin gives a connection. Database roles and grants decide what you can do after that. See Database.